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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
stances. 34 In that case the defendant needed counsel assigned to examine the
record of the trial, which was inaccessible to him on account of his imprisonment. That case relied on the New York Constitution. The majority of the
Court 1stinguished it as another case dealing with the right of an indigent to
a free transcript of the trial proceedings.
It would seem that the decision that the Court has reached is within the
framework of existing case law, but italso seems proper to note again the underlying rationale of the Griffin case: "There can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."3 5
Admissibility of Confession Obtained Prior to Arraignment
In People v. Spano,36 the defendant was surrendered to the police by his
attorney pursuant to a bench warrant issued on an indictment for murder in
the first degree. He was taken into custody at 7:15 P.M. and arraigned the next
morning. Before his arraignment, however, Spano had been questioned for
several hours by the police, and contrary to the instructions of his attorney, had
made a complete confession. At the trial the confession was admitted into evidence. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death.
On appeal the defense argued that even though the confession was voluntarily made it should not have been admitted into evidence because Spano's
detention by the police was illegal. The majority affirmed the conviction and
pointed out that even if the detention had been illegal (a fact not established)
37
the confession would be admissible since it was voluntarily given.
The dissent agreed that the test of voluntariness is still valid but argued
that it was not controlling in the case at bar. Judge Desmond, writing for the
dissent, maintained that the confession should have been excluded since it was
extracted in the very course of judicial proceedings, and that therefore the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel and his privilege
against self-incrimination.
The argument based on the right against self-incrimination was disposed
of by the majority by pointing out that it is available only in cases where incriminating disclosures have been extorted by the constraint of legal process38
34. People v. Kalan, 2 N.Y.2d 278, 159 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1957).
35. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1955).
36. 4 N.Y.2d 256, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1958).
37. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §395; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
38. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926); Adams v. New
York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
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In his dissent, Judge Desmond seems to extend the meaning of the term
judicial proceedings beyond its traditional scope. Heretofore it has applied only
to formal court room proceedings and not to informal questionings3 9 In New
York, by statute, the right to counsel accrues upon arraignment.40 The dissent
would give a defendant the right to have counsel present at any informal questionings which take place after indictment'
There has been little judicial restriction on the right of the police to question an accused at any time.42 The right of the accused is to remain silent. It
is a personal right and is not dependent upon whether or not he has retained
an attorney.43 Perhaps it is a hollow right when a person is initially accused of
a crime since at that moment the accused, often under pressure from the police, does not have the presence of mind to exercise it prudently. 44 On the other
hand, interrogation is a useful technique in criminal investigations and often
results in the immediate release of the innocent. Even so, the state would not
be prejudiced if the police were denied the opportunity to question a defendant
in secret after an indictment has been returned, since at that time the state has
a prima fade case and presumably enough evidence to sustain the charge.
While the position of the dissent may not appear logically justified, it
seems to reflect a general dissatisfaction with the New York doctrine as to the
admissibility of illegally obtained confessions and a desire to limit its scope.
Unconstitutionality of City Ordinance Against Lounging or .Loitering on Public Streets
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution imposes the requirement
that penal legislation* avoid "the injustice of prohibiting conduct in terms so
vague as to make the understanding of what is proscribed a guess-work too
difficult for confident judgment ....-45 People v.Diaz4 6 called for the appli39. Mitchel v. Cropsey, 177 App.Div. 663, 164 N.Y.S. 336 (2d Dep't 1917).
40. N. Y. CODE CpIm. PROC. §§188, 189, 296-a, 308, 699. But see Gilmore v.
U. S., 129 F.2d 199 (1942), where the court held that the defendant's constitutional right to the assistance of counsel accrues with the returning of an indictment against him.
41. But see Ciceria v. La Gay, 78 S.Ct. 1297 (1958), where the court held
on almost identical facts that the constitutional right to counsel had not been
violated. But note that no indictment was outstanding when questioning took
place.
42. See Crooker v. California, 78 S.Ct. 1287 (1958).
43. In re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (1931).
44. See dissent by Justice Douglas in Ciceria v. La Gay, supra note 40
and Crooker v. State of California, supra note 41. Cf. People v. McMahon, 15
N.Y. 384 (1857), and People v. Mondon, 103 N.Y. 211, 8 N.E. 496 (1886). But
see People v. Ferola, 215 N.Y. 285, 109 N.E. 500 (1915); WGMop, EvWDENcr
§851 (3d ed. 1940).
45. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 157 (1945).

